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ABSTRACT 
This thesis seeks to answer the question: How can Congress improve its oversight of the 
Department of Homeland Security (DHS)? It is widely accepted that congressional 
oversight of DHS is, at best, not optimal. Currently, 108 committees and subcommittees 
have jurisdiction over DHS. To provide some perspective, the Department of Defense 
(DoD) falls under only 36, with more than 10 times the budget. The jurisdictional 
disparity between the committees and subcommittees is preventing Congress from 
providing efficient and effective oversight, which is negatively affecting DHS’s ability to 
perform its function as the lead federal agency in homeland security. The desired end-
state for this research project it to determine why Congress has failed to engage in 
reforms and determine what changes, if any, are feasible in improving congressional 
oversight of DHS.  
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Of all our recommendations, strengthening congressional oversight may 
be among the most difficult and important.1  
A. MAJOR RESEARCH QUESTION 
This thesis seeks to answer the question: How can Congress improve its oversight 
of the Department of Homeland Security (DHS)? It is widely accepted that congressional 
oversight of DHS is, at best, not optimal. Currently, 108 committees and subcommittees 
have jurisdiction over DHS.2 To provide some perspective, the Department of Defense 
(DoD) falls under only 36, with more than 10 times the budget.3 The jurisdictional 
disparity between the committees and subcommittees is preventing Congress from 
providing efficient and effective oversight, which is negatively affecting DHS’s ability to 
perform its function as the lead federal agency in homeland security. The desired end-
state for this research project it to determine why Congress has failed to engage in 
reforms and determine what changes are feasible in improving congressional oversight of 
DHS.  
B. IMPORTANCE 
President Woodrow Wilson stated, “it is the proper duty of a representative body 
to look diligently into every affair of government and to talk much about what it sees. It 
is meant to be the eyes and the voice, and to embody the wisdom and will of its 
constituents.”4 Oversight is the method through which Congress supervises delegated 
                                                 
1 National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States, Philip Zelikow, Bonnie D. 
Jenkins, and Ernest R. May, The 9/11 Commission Report (New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 2004), 
419. 
2 Associated Press, “Department of Homeland Security Overwhelmed by Congressional Oversight,” 
FOX News, May 17, 2011, http://www.fox news .com/politics/2011/05/17/homeland–security–department–
overwhelmed–congressional–oversight/. 
3 Paul Rosenzweig, Jena B. Baker, and James J. Carafano, “Stopping the Chaos: A Proposal for 
Reorganization of Congressional Oversight of the Department of Homeland Security,” Heritage 
Foundation WebMemo, no. 3046, November 4, 2010, 1. 
4 U.S. Library of Congress, Congressional Research Service, Congressional Oversight Manual, by 
Frederick M. Kaiser, Walter J. Olezek, and Todd B. Tatelman, CRS Report RL30240 (Washington, DC: 
Office of Congressional Information and Publishing, June 10, 2011), 4. 
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authority to entities within the executive branch of government. Oversight serves multiple 
purposes: ensure executive compliance with Congress’ intent, improve the efficiency and 
effectiveness of government programs, prevent fraud waste and abuse, inform the public, 
and protect civil liberties, to name a few.5 Considering that DHS directly interacts with 
more than 3.3 million people daily, more than any other federal agency, and that the 
problem of managing the delicate balance between the need for increased security while 
protecting civil liberties lies largely within the realm of homeland security, few other 
elements in government require more robust oversight than DHS.6 However, the 
complicated committee structure through which oversight of DHS is conducted is 
preventing Congress from meeting its purpose. The following examples help illustrate 
this point.  
In 2009, DHS officials responded to 11,680 letters, gave 2,058 briefings, and 
participated in 166 hearings to Congress.7 This massive demand for information forces 
DHS officials to, as Secretary of DHS Janet Napolitano stated, “spend more time 
responding to congressional requests and requirements than executing their mandated 
homeland security responsibilities.”8 Congressional oversight, in its current form, 
presents at the very least an enormous distraction to DHS. 
For several months before and after the “Underwear Bomber” incident on 
December 25, 2009, the Customs and Border Protection agency (CBP) operated without a 
commissioner. Jurisdiction for the former U.S. Customs Service, which was reorganized 
under CBP, belonged to the Senate Finance Committee, which maintained oversight of 
the agency after it was moved from the Department of Treasury to DHS.9 Preoccupied 
                                                 
5 U.S. Library of Congress, Congressional Research Service, Congressional Oversight, by L. Elaine 
Halchin and Frederick M. Kaiser, CRS Report 97-936 (Washington, DC: Office of Congressional 
Information and Publishing, October 17, 2012), 1–2. 
6 Gary M. Shiffman and Jonathan Hoffman, “The Department of Homeland Security: Chief of 
Coordination,” in The National Security Enterprise: Navigating the Labyrinth, ed. Roger Z. George and 
Harvey Rishikof (Washington, DC: Georgetown University Press, 2011), 212. 
7 Amy Zegart, “Congress: Pre–9/11 State of Mind,” Defining Ideas: Hoover Institution Journal, July 
2008, http://www.hoover.org/publications/defining–ideas/articles/87216. 
8 Associated Press, “Homeland Security Overwhelmed by Oversight.” 
9 Shiffman and Hoffman, “The Department of Homeland Security,” 209. 
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with the health care debate, the committee failed to hold a confirmation hearing on the 
President’s nominee for commissioner, while it conducted confirmation hearings for 
Health and Human Services nominees.10 Due largely to the structure of Congress’ 
oversight of DHS, the CBP was left without its most senior leader, even after agency 
mistakes allowed a terrorist to board a United States (U.S.) bound airplane.  
Since the establishment of DHS, Congress has failed to pass a homeland security 
authorization bill.11 The House Homeland Security Committee has managed to draft 
legislation each year; however, the Senate Committee on Homeland Security and 
Governmental Affairs has not reciprocated the effort.12 This inaction can be attributed to 
the Senate’s failure to create an independent committee on homeland security armed with 
the exclusive legislative power to create an authorization bill, and whose sole focus is 
homeland security. The current Senate committee has to balance focus between its 
governmental affairs responsibility, which encompasses the entire federal government, 
while also battling other committees that share jurisdiction over DHS.13 
These three examples highlight the relevance of the topic. Critics argue that the 
structure of congressional oversight is preventing DHS from continuing its evolution into 
the lead coordinating agency of the national enterprise to improve homeland security. 
Failure to reform the oversight process could, at best, prolong DHS’s evolution into a 
unified and effective organization, or at worst, directly contribute to the failure to 
coordinate the prevention, response, and/or recovery during the next national level 
catastrophe.  
                                                 
10 Daniel J. Kaniewski, “Congress Should Consider Its Own Failures in Attempted Bombing,” Roll 
Call, Congressional Quarterly, February 19, 2010. 
11 Govtrack.us, “S. 1546 (112th): Department of Homeland Security Authorization Act of 2012,” 
(n.d.), http://www.govtrack.us/congress/bills/112/s1546; Govtrack.us, “H.R. 3116 (112th): Department of 
Homeland Security Authorization Act of 2012,” (n.d.), http://www.govtrack.us/congress/bills/112/hr3116. 
12 Both the Senate and House have passed authorizations bills this year (2012), which are currently in 
conference. Once the differences in the bills are reconciled, they will be sent back to both chambers for 
final debate and voting. If the bill passes the final votes in the House and Senate, and the President signs 
the bill, this bill will be the first authorization bill for Homeland Security. James J. Carafano, “Homeland 
Security in the Next Administration,” Heritage Foundation Lectures, no. 1085, May 16, 2008, 2. 
13 Thomas M. Susman, “Congressional Oversight of Homeland Security,” Administrative and 
Regulatory Law News 30, no. 1 (Fall 2004): 3. 
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C. PROBLEMS AND HYPOTHESES 
In searching for options to improve congressional oversight from its current form 
and function, two major problems are raised. The first and most obvious problem is to 
determine why, despite the obvious failures and calls for change, Congress has failed to 
reform itself. The second problem, stemming from the first, is to determine what reforms, 
if any, can improve oversight of DHS.  
The first problem raised by this research project is to determine why Congress has 
failed to engage in any reforms to match the dramatic reorganization occurring within the 
executive branch. Numerous warnings and recommendations were directed towards 
Congress before, during, and after the establishment of DHS. Many experts in homeland 
security warned of exactly the problems that have now beset Congress and DHS. They 
offered recommendations to guide congressional reform, and to promote robust oversight 
that would facilitate the establishment and evolution of DHS. Most often cited are the 
recommendations detailed in the 9/11 Commission report stating, “Congress should 
create a single, principal point of oversight and review for homeland security.”14 
However, with the exception of creating Appropriations Subcommittees for Homeland 
Security in both the House and Senate and the establishment of a permanent standing 
committee for Homeland Security in the House, Congress has largely ignored the 
recommendations.15  
Congress has avoided reforms because few of the recommendations consider the 
institutional and political purposes that matter to legislators. The majority of the 
recommendations are focused exclusively on the programmatic purposes of oversight: to 
improve the efficiency, economy, and effectiveness of DHS in leading the national 
enterprise in homeland security. Institutionally, the reforms could weaken Congress’ 
ability to act as a check on the executive branch. Additionally, too much streamlining 
could result in committees and subcommittees becoming overwhelmed by the massive 
                                                 
14 National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States, The 9/11 Commission Report, 
421. 
15 CSIS–BENS Task Force White Paper, “Untangling the Web: Congressional Oversight and the 
Department of Homeland Security,” Center for Strategic and International Studies, December 10, 2004, 2.  
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and increasingly complex workload that comes from contemporary issues. Politically, 
oversight jurisdiction in the homeland security realm and over DHS provide a resource 
rich environment for election-seeking activities. Reforms that strip credit claiming, 
position taking, and advertising opportunities away from members of Congress threaten 
their ability to pursue their reelection goals, the most potent incentive driving 
Congressional behavior. 
The second problem, stemming from the first, is how to reconcile the 
recommended congressional changes with the factors inhibiting congressional reform. 
This thesis argues that any recommendation for reform will have to address institutional 
and political incentives also important to Congress if they are to be implemented. 
Research conducted for this thesis suggests that reforms that involve dramatic 
restructuring of committee and subcommittee jurisdiction are highly unlikely. The system 
that exists may represent the best possible balance between the conflicting purposes for 
congressional oversight; the delicate balance of power between the executive and 
legislative branches is protected and members of Congress are organized to conduct 
election-seeking activities. Congress has attempted significant reforms to the committee 
system during three periods in congressional history: 1940s, 1970s, and 1990s. However, 
due largely to the political purposes of oversight, reforms to the committee system have 
never been substantive or lasting. Only a limited number of options to improve 
congressional oversight on DHS would address the programmatic, institutional, and 
political preventing reform.  
D. LITERATURE REVIEW 
DHS was formed during an era in which Congress has been criticized for its 
failure to perform its oversight function. Books and articles detailing both a quantitative 
and qualitative decline in congressional oversight dominate the existing literature, with 
Thomas Mann and Norman J Ornstein among the most prolific critics. Mann and 
Ornstein argue that unlike the activist Congress of the 1970s, senators and representatives 
today are suffering from a lack of institutional identity. Members of Congress see 
themselves as representatives of their states and parties before they identify themselves as 
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members of the House or Senate.16 This predominantly partisan identification places 
electoral and partisan incentives above all others. When and what caused the decline in 
institutional identity differs throughout the literature; however, Mann and Ornstein, as 
well as many others, point to the beginning of the Gingrich-led Congress in the early 
1990s and the election of President Clinton. As a byproduct, congressional leaders began 
to resist reform. Efforts to reform the jurisdictional and procedural systems for oversight 
had been periodically proposed by congressional leadership in the 1970s and 1980s, but 
as institutional identities declined, almost no effort has been made to restructure the 
processes or structure of congressional oversight.17 
Whatever else might have changed after the terror attacks of September 11, 2001, 
the primacy of partisanship in Congress came through almost entirely unchanged. Due to 
partisan politics, Congress largely deferred the construction of DHS to the executive 
branch.18 The decline in oversight hearings and investigations, and the fractured 
committee organization, inhibited Congress’ ability to guide, properly fund, and support 
the newly formed DHS, which contributed to DHS’s failures to respond to Hurricane 
Katrina in 2005.19 Other than the initial creation of appropriations subcommittees for 
homeland security, and the eventual establishment of a standing House Homeland 
Security Committee, little was done.20 In the end, due to personal and electoral 
incentives, Congress refused to alter the existing jurisdictional boundaries, choosing 
instead to maintain committees and subcommittees as they were before 9/11, despite 
some obvious failures in oversight.21   
As stated in a report from the Center for Strategic and International Studies 
(CSIS), the fragmented jurisdictional structure of Congress’ oversight “preserves the 
                                                 
16 Thomas Mann and Norman J. Ornstein, The Broken Branch: How Congress Is Failing America And 
How To Get It Back on Track (New York: Oxford University Press, 2008), 146–147. 
17 Mann and Ornstein, The Broken Branch, 150. 
18 Harold C. Reylea, “Organizing for Homeland Security,” Presidential Studies Quarterly 33, no. 3 
(September 2003): 622. 
19 Norman J. Ornstein and Thomas Mann, “When Congress Checks Out,” Foreign Affairs 85, no. 6 
(November/December 2006): 70.  
20 CSIS–BENS Task Force White Paper, “Untangling the Web,” 2. 
21 Ornstein and Mann, “When Congress Checks Out,” 70–72. 
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rivalries and cultural barriers that the creation of the Department was intended to 
eliminate; and it prevents DHS from acting as a single, well coordinated team.”22 By 
maintaining the jurisdictional boundaries that existed before DHS was established, the 
homeland security effort in Congress has produced several negative effects on the policy 
regime. The jurisdictional disparity in Congress has intensified cultural differences and 
conflict within DHS and prevented cohesion. It has also created conflicts and 
jurisdictional turf battles in Congress that have impeded the production of needed 
legislation, such as an authorizations bill, and has resulted in poor legislation, such as the 
Secured Freight Initiative requiring the screening of 100 percent of shipping containers 
entering the United States.23 
A vast amount of literature recommends an array of reforms geared toward the 
same purpose: increasing the efficiency and effectiveness of Congress’ oversight 
structure and process of DHS. One of the most often cited recommendations comes from 
the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks upon the United States (9/11 
Commission). The 9/11 Commission recommended the consolidation of oversight for 
intelligence and counter terrorism into a single committee, based on the joint committee 
model, or the creation of a single committee in both the House and Senate armed with 
both appropriations and authorizations powers.24 Addressing homeland security 
specifically, the 9/11 Commission recommended that oversight should not, at the very 
least, expand beyond one appropriations and one authorizations committee in each 
chamber.25  
The Heritage Foundation published a less aggressive recommendation for reform 
in 2010. The report recommends an expansive overhaul of the oversight structure by 
                                                 
22 CSIS–BENS Task Force White Paper, “Untangling the Web,” 2. 
23 Under the Container Security Initiative (CSI), the predecessor to the Secured Freight Initiative 
(SFI), only containers determined to be high risk are scanned. The SFI was mandated by Congress before 
the effectiveness of CSI could be established by DHS. Many experts in homeland security argue that the 
SFI is unfeasible in terms of resources and costs, when compared to CSI. Carafano, “Homeland Security in 
the Next Administration,” 2, 4; Peter J. May, Ashley E. Jochim, and Joshua Sapotichne, “Constructing 
Homeland Security: An Anemic Policy Regime,” The Policy Studies Journal 39, no. 2 (2011): 301.  
24 National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States, The 9/11 Commission Report, 
419–420. 
25 Ibid., 421. 
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building a model based on the structure of oversight for DoD, which differs from most 
recommendations in that it proposes the establishment of three standing committees in 
the House and Senate, with seven subcommittees organized along DHS’s operational 
lines.26 Although the Heritage report calls for a significant reduction in committees and 
subcommittees, it does not recommend cuts and process changes as deeply as all the 
previous recommendations arguing for single points of oversight or the joint committee 
model.  
On the topic of reforming congressional oversight, similar studies have been 
conducted on reforms needed to improve oversight of the intelligence community. 
Although the two realms have some significant differences, they both suffer from 
jurisdictional disparity and weak processes. However, just as with the literature 
recommending reforms for DHS, the reforms recommended for the intelligence 
community call for the establishment of a joint committee, or more powerful committees 
in the House and Senate with appropriations and authorizations powers.27 Reports from 
the Brookings Institution, CSIS, and the Congressional Research Service (CRS), as well 
as notable homeland security experts, such as Donald Kettl, all recommend similar 
reforms.28 
Very little literature defends the current oversight system. In fact, many 
Congressmen agree with the criticisms of the oversight structure. Representative Peter 
King, House Homeland Security Committee chairman, called the current organization, 
“disgraceful.”29 However, some credible arguments exist for why Congress avoids 
reform. Representative Lamar Smith, chairman of the House Judiciary Committee, states 
                                                 
26 Rosenzweig, Baker, and Carafano, “Stopping the Chaos,” 2–3. 
27 U.S. Library of Congress, Congressional Research Service, Congressional Oversight of 
Intelligence: Current Structure and Alternatives, by L. Elaine Halchin and Frederick M. Kaiser, CRS 
Report RL32525 (Washington, DC: Office of Congressional Information and Publishing, May 14, 2012,) 
35–36. 
28 Donald F. Kettl, System Under Stress: Homeland Security and American Politics (Washington DC: 
Congressional Quarterly Press, 2007), 46–47; U.S. Library of Congress, Congressional Research Service, 
House and Senate Committee Organization and Jurisdiction: Considerations Related to Proposed 
Department of Homeland Security, by Judy Schneider, CRS Report RL31449 (Washington, DC: Office of 
Congressional Information and Publishing, June 10, 2002). 
29 Associated Press, “Homeland Security Overwhelmed by Oversight.” 
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that Congress seeks “purposeful redundancy.”30 Congress intentionally maintains a 
certain degree of jurisdictional disparity. In the ever present struggle for power with the 
executive branch, Congress benefits from multiple oversight committees that can engage 
the executive branch from multiple angles.31 Streamlining oversight could result in a 
relationship between Congress and the Executive branch better described as a 
partnership, than a checks and balances.  
In separate articles, Christopher Davis and Frederick Kaiser highlight some of the 
potential dangers in creating a joint committee. The joint committee model would 
streamline the oversight process by placing the homeland security realm inside the 
purview of only one committee, with appropriations and authorizations powers. By 
limiting the number of committees with jurisdiction on a specific issue, and eliminating 
the need for the House Senate conference to reconcile differences in legislation, Congress 
loses an internal checks and balances. Unifying the appropriations and authorizations 
process into one committee in each chamber of Congress only encourages the bicameral 
conference to reconcile any legislation, and does little to improve the problems that come 
from a joint committee.32 
Despite the obvious need for, at the very least, some cuts in jurisdiction, the 
literature highlights that the failure to reform is due mostly to a lack of political 
incentives; Congressmen are not able to drop their partisan and personal interests for the 
greater good of improving homeland security. Missing from the current debate are 
recommendations that account for the political incentives of Representatives and 
Senators. Almost every article recognizes the political realities; however, their 
recommendations are made purely from a homeland security perspective. Considering  
 
                                                 
30 Associated Press, “Homeland Security Overwhelmed by Oversight.” 
31Gerald F. Warburg, “Congress: Checking Presidential Power,” in The National Security Enterprise: 
Navigating the Labyrinth, ed. Roger Z. George and Harvey Rishikof (Washington, DC: Georgetown 
University Press, 2011), 239. 
32 Christopher M. Davis, “9/11 Commission Recommendations: Joint Committee on Atomic Energy–
A Model for Congressional Oversight?,” in 9/11 Commission Recommendations, ed. John Iseby (New 
York: Nova Science Publishers, 2008), 83–87; U.S. Library of Congress, Congressional Research Service, 
Congressional Oversight of Intelligence, 9–14. 
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that Congress’ refusal to reform has spanned two national emergencies and 10 years, 
proposals for reform must begin to understand the congressional perspective if feasible 
options can be constructed.  
E. METHODS AND SOURCES 
The ultimate goal for this research project is to develop recommendations for 
improving congressional oversight of DHS. This thesis does that by performing three 
tasks: arguing that reform is necessary, identifying why Congress has rejected all 
proposed reforms, and developing options for reform that reconcile Congress’ reasons for 
maintaining the status quo.  
In arguing that reform is necessary, this thesis first examines the problems created 
by the current organization and processes for oversight of DHS. Recommendations for 
reform are analyzed from a homeland security perspective; what options would facilitate 
DHS’s ability to perform its function. All the options for reform are assessed by the 
specific desired effect, such as streamlining jurisdiction, which includes a wide range of 
options that would have varied effects on DHS, e.g., reorganizing to single points of 
oversight versus the establishment of several standing committees with several 
subcommittees. 
To determine why Congress has rejected reforms, this thesis then explores the 
incentives and disincentives for members of Congress. In understanding these behavioral 
motivators, the recommendations for reform can be reconsidered from a congressional 
perspective. When considering the goals of the members of Congress, very few of the 
options recommended will be feasible, for both institutional and political reasons. 
Additionally, the recommendations that are feasible to Congress may not be substantive 
enough, from a homeland security perspective.  
F. THESIS OVERVIEW 
This thesis consists of six chapters. Following this introduction, the second 
chapter includes general knowledge of congressional oversight the audience must have to 
understand the problem. Chapter II includes sections on the purpose, legal foundations, 
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and congressional organization for oversight. The third chapter discusses the problems 
with oversight of DHS specifically. Arguing for the need for congressional reforms, the 
jurisdictional structure and its negative effects on DHS are presented. The fourth chapter 
examines the array of recommendations for congressional reform, to include the joint 
committee model, DoD model, and hybrid options. The fifth chapter details the 
institutional and political factors that affect the preferences of members of Congress. This 
chapter discusses how members of Congress benefit from the current system and what 
would be lost by engaging in the proposed reforms. The final chapter will examine 
periods of congressional reform in the past, focusing on the 1940s, 1970s, and the 
attempted reforms in the 1990s, and highlights that reforms to the committee system have 
never been substantive or lasting. Considering the programmatic success in the current 
system and limited options that account for the institutional and political factors that 
inhibit congressional reform, this thesis provides several recommendations to improve 
congressional oversight of DHS. 
 12
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II. CONGRESSIONAL OVERSIGHT: BACKGROUND 
Good oversight helps Congress evaluate how programs are administered 
and how they perform; ferret out waste and fraud; determine whether 
programs have outlived their usefulness; compel the administration to 
explain or justify its policies; and ensure that the federal government is run 
in a cost-effective, efficient manner.33  
The U.S. Constitution frames a system of government designed to create conflict; 
some of the powers of the government are separated among the executive, legislative, and 
judicial branches, while other powers are shared or overlap. This intentional separation 
and overlap provide a mechanism that ensures that neither the executive nor legislative 
branch accrue too much power, and forces each branch to communicate, cooperate, and 
conflict with each other when necessary.34 Initially after the Declaration of Independence 
and formation of an American national government, no executive branch was established 
and many of the executive’s powers, in the British tradition, were entrusted to the 
Continental Congress. By the time of the Constitutional convention, many of the failures 
and inefficiencies of the Continental Congress highlighted the need for a strong executive 
branch. However, the idea of an executive branch with enormous powers frightened the 
founding fathers. The Declaration of Independence and Revolutionary War were largely 
motivated by the American perception of unjust rule at the hands of a monarch with 
unlimited powers. The framers of the Constitution had the difficult task of building a 
strong central government headed by an executive branch, but without the power to 
impose a tyranny. For the founding fathers, the concepts of separation of powers, and 
checks and balances, were the guiding principles that would allow them to accomplish 
their task.35  
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The dramatic expansion, in size and capability, of the executive bureaucracy since 
the close of World War II and rise of increasingly complex issues that cross multiple 
policy domains, has forced Congress to defer and delegate more responsibility to the 
executive branch. In this contemporary era, to maintain the critical balance of power as 
intended by the founding fathers requires the execution of robust and persistent oversight 
by members of Congress.36 Oversight refers to Congress’s supervision of the executive 
branch for multiple purposes: ensure executive compliance with Congress’ intent, 
improve the efficiency and effectiveness of government programs, prevent fraud waste 
and abuse, inform the public, and protect civil liberties, to name a few.37 Congressional 
oversight can be organized into three categories: legislative, fiscal, and investigative.38 
Through these three types of oversight, implicitly mandated through the enumerated 
powers in the U.S. Constitution and protected through rulings by the Supreme Court, 
Congress has the ability to supervise and guide the operation of departments and agencies 
within the executive branch to ensure the government operates efficiently and effectively, 
in accordance with the intent of Congress, and transparent to the American public. 
A. LEGAL ROOTS OF CONGRESSIONAL OVERSIGHT 
Congress’ power to conduct oversight is implicit, stemming from the wide range 
of powers explicitly granted to Congress by the U.S. Constitution and upheld in rulings 
from the Supreme Court.39 Many of the powers detailed in Article I, Section 8, require 
Congress to have the ability to engage and evaluate the executive to determine how best 
to apply congressional power. For example, Article I, Section 8 grants Congress the 
power to maintain the Navy. Congress could not perform its mandated power without 
being able to determine what the Navy is doing, how it is performing, what it requires to 
perform better, or how much money is required to maintain or improve the force; the 
power to maintain a Navy requires Congress to have the power to oversee. 
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For each type of oversight, a corresponding legal foundation provides Congress 
with the authority to conduct oversight on the executive branch. Congress’ authority to 
conduct legislative oversight stems from Article 1, Section 8, of the Constitution, which 
grants Congress the power, “to make all Laws which shall be necessary and proper for 
carrying into Execution the foregoing Powers, and all other Powers vested by this 
Constitution in the Government of the United States, or in any Department or Officer 
thereof.”40 Also known as the necessary and proper or elastic clause, this power grants 
Congress the ability to create legislation that directs the performance of the executive 
branch; statutorily stating what must or cannot be done.41  
Congress’ authority to conduct fiscal oversight stems from Article I, Section 9 of 
the Constitution, which states, “no Money shall be drawn from the Treasury, but in 
Consequence of Appropriations made by Law.”42 Also known as the power of the purse, 
the power over appropriations provides Congress with its most powerful check on the 
executive branch. Through the power of the purse, Congress can mandate what the 
executive can or cannot do, and adjust the scope of executive activity through funding.43 
To perform legislative and fiscal oversight, Congress must conduct investigations 
to gather information guiding the legislative and fiscal processes. Investigations can also 
be a conducted for no other purpose than to inform the government and the public on the 
efficiency and effectiveness of executive activities not captured in the legislative or fiscal 
processes, investigative oversight. The Constitution does not explicitly grant Congress 
authority to conduct investigations; however, numerous Supreme Court decisions have 
supported the implied need for investigative authority. In McGrain v. Daugherty (1927), 
the Supreme Court stated, “we are of [the] opinion that the power of inquiry–with the 
process to enforce it–is an essential and appropriate auxiliary to the legislative 
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function.”44 In Watkins v. United States (1957), the Supreme Court reinforced the 1927 
ruling, stating that Congress’ power to conduct investigations into the departments within 
the executive, in the furtherance of Congressional tasks, were inherent in the legislative 
process.45  
The era of modern congressional oversight stems from the passing of the 
Legislative Reorganization Act of 1946. For the first time, Congress’ oversight 
responsibility was codified by statute.46 The act mandated Congress’ “continued 
watchfulness” over the executive branch of government.”47 Most importantly, the 
Legislative Reorganization Act reorganized Congress into the modern committee system 
capable of conducting robust and persistent oversight. The act authorized the 
establishment of professional staffs for all committees, eliminated many redundant 
committees, readjusted jurisdictions, and set rules for the establishment of 
subcommittees.48 Based on the powers granted to Congress by the U.S. Constitution, 
supported by the Supreme Court, and statutorily reorganized to conduct continued 
watchfulness, today’s Congress has the ability to maintain oversight of the expanding 
executive branch. 
B. COMMITTEE SYSTEM 
Congress conducts oversight primarily through the committee system. The 
committee system allows Congress to spread the responsibility for oversight among 
specialized teams that have developed expertise in specific policy realms and 
jurisdictions. It is in committees that legislation is initially considered, investigations 
conducted, hearings held, and proposals for Congressional action developed. 
Congressional committees are comprised of three types: standing, select, and joint. 
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Standing committees, the backbone of the committee system, propose legislation 
for consideration by the rest of the Congress. Standing committees are permanent 
elements that control legislative authority and are responsible for providing oversight of 
agencies that operate within their jurisdiction.49 Most committees consider 
authorizations, such as the armed service committees, which authorizes all executive 
agencies programs and activities. Other committees conduct appropriations, which 
allocates funds to authorized programs and activities. The budget committees set the total 
national expenditure that guide authorizations and appropriations.50 Government 
operations committees, such as the Senate Committee on Homeland Security and 
Governmental Affairs and the House Committee on Governmental Reform, also monitor 
the general operation of the government.51 Standing committees are authorized to 
establish subcommittees with narrow focused expert staffs and delegate legislative 
jurisdiction to those subcommittees.52 Currently, the House has 20 standing committees 
and the Senate 16.53 
Select committees, also referred to as special committees, are established to 
conduct investigations on topics and issues that do not fall within the jurisdiction of one 
of the standing committees or require special attention. Select committees are normally 
temporary, primarily produce reports that inform the government and public, and do not 
propose legislation. In some cases, as with the select intelligence committees in the 
House and Senate, select committees can be permanent and command legislative 
jurisdiction. Currently, the House has four select committees and the Senate one.54 
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Joint committees combine members of both chambers of Congress into one 
committee for review and coordination on policy or to oversee basic government 
functions. Some are temporary, such as the Conference committees, which reconcile the 
differences between bills proposed in the separate chambers to create unified legislation. 
Others are permanent, such as the Joint Committee on Printing, which oversees the 
Government Printing Office.55 Typically, joint committees are not granted legislative 
jurisdiction. One permanent joint committee was granted legislative jurisdiction, the Joint 
Committee on Atomic Energy. The joint committee was established in 1947 to oversee 
the newly established Atomic Energy Commission and was granted exclusive jurisdiction 
over all aspects of nuclear power. It was widely regarded as the most powerful committee 
in Congressional history, but problems with exclusive jurisdiction led to the reallocation 
of its jurisdictional powers to other committees in both chambers and its abolishment in 
1977.56 Currently, Congress has four joint committees.57 
Subcommittees are critical elements in the conduct of oversight. As stated 
previously, standing committees can establish subcommittees and assign them a narrow 
focus within the jurisdiction of the parent standing committee to enable the standing 
committees to delegate oversight responsibility to more focused groups with specialized 
staffs. Standing committees can create an unlimited number of subcommittees in the 
Senate. House Rule X limits the number of subcommittees to five; however, more 
subcommittees are permitted under special circumstances, as is the case with House 
Appropriations Subcommittees. Currently, the House has 103 subcommittees and the 
Senate 74.58 
Committee jurisdiction is established by precedent; once a committee has 
considered an issue or proposed legislation, precedent has been set and that policy area 
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falls into the jurisdiction of that committee.59 Codified by House Rule X and Senate Rule 
XXV, committee jurisdiction is most often defined by subject matter, not by executive 
departmental missions and functions. For this reason, many committees oversee the same 
departments that have broad functions and missions. For example, although House Rule 
X gives the House Homeland Security Committee jurisdiction over homeland security 
policy, it also gives jurisdiction of immigration and naturalization to the Judiciary 
Committee, and jurisdiction of federal management of emergencies and natural disasters 
to the Transportation and Infrastructure Committee.60 Both immigration and emergency 
and disaster management are core functions of DHS. When coupled with comprehensive 
oversight, as it is known in the Senate, or special oversight, as it is known in the House, 
granted to some committees, such as the Agricultural Committee, jurisdiction for one 
executive department or an agency within a department can fall under the jurisdiction of 
multiple standing committees and their subcommittees; as is the case with DHS.61 
C. OVERSIGHT PROCESSES 
Congress conducts legislative, fiscal and investigative oversight of the executive 
through several formal processes, with the most important being appropriations, 
authorizations, investigations, and confirmations. These processes provide Congress with 
access to executive agencies and individuals, which facilitates evaluation of performance 
and the production of statutory and non-statutory control to guide how executive agencies 
operate. Ideally, the result of each of these processes is the production of legislation or 
administrative change that ensures the government operates efficiently and effectively, in 
accordance with the intent of Congress, and transparent to the American public.  
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The authorizations process is the first step in budgeting executive agencies. All 
executive departments and agencies must seek approval for their programs and activities 
by authorizations committees to provide responsible committees with the opportunity to 
evaluate executive agencies and make changes by increasing or reducing the scope of a 
specific activity or program, mandating new and eliminating old programs, or merging 
programs conducted by multiple agencies to ensure the efficiency and effectiveness of 
executive operations. Through authorization legislation, authorizing committees can 
establish statutory controls that guide what executive agencies can do and encourages 
periodic reporting on their effectiveness.62  
The appropriations process comprises the second, arguably, the most important 
step in budgeting executive agencies. Appropriators hold significant influence on the 
executive branch as they ultimately determine which agency initiatives receive funding. 
Appropriators evaluate executive agency spending and performance and determine the 
amount of funds to be allocated to ensure the efficiency and effectiveness of executive 
operations. Through appropriations legislation, appropriations committees and 
subcommittees can establish statutory controls that state what activities and programs are 
funded, establish limits on how much can be spent by the agency as a whole or for 
individual programs, and establishes time limits for spending.63  
Authorization alone does not guarantee that a program or activity will receive 
funding. In fact, appropriations committees and subcommittees have the ability to fund or 
cut funding to programs and activities that authorizations committees have or have not 
authorized, which has resulted in authorizations committees losing influence over 
executive agencies. In a 2007 Senate Select Committee on Intelligence hearing on 
Congressional oversight of the intelligence community, Representative Lee Hamilton 
warned, “the intelligence community will not ignore you [Senate Select Committee on 
Intelligence], but they will work around you... they will go to the appropriations 
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committee.”64 As this approach has become a persistent problem, the authorizations 
process has dramatically declined, which has degraded a critical oversight mechanism, 
and placed more burden on the already overwhelmed appropriations committees and 
subcommittees.65 
The investigative process is critical in maintaining continued watchfulness of 
executive agencies. To react to new or emerging issues, or identify issues not captured by 
other oversight processes, members of Congress can organize and conduct investigations 
in different forms, such as case work, hearings, program evaluations, or inquiries, on the 
executive branch, private individuals and organizations, or other members of Congress. 
Through conducting investigations, committees and subcommittees can gather 
information needed to guide the production of legislation, inform the public to ensure 
transparent government, and ensure the executive branch is operating efficiently, 
effectively, and within the intent of Congress. Individual members of Congress, existing 
committees and subcommittees, and newly formed select or joint committees, can 
organize investigations. Members of Congress can task support agencies, such as the 
Inspector General offices within the executive agencies, the Government Accountability 
Office (GAO), CRS, or the Congressional Budget Office (CBO), or contract external 
commissions, such as the Brookings Institution, or ad hoc groups, such as the 9/11 
Commission, to conduct or support investigations.66  
The confirmations process provides Congress with another mechanism through 
which to conduct oversight. Under Article II, Section 2, the Senate must confirm 
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Senate committees with the opportunity, through nomination hearings, to evaluate and 
provide initial guidance to candidates for leadership of the executive agencies they 
oversee.67  
In addition to the formal oversight processes, Congress also uses many informal 
processes through which to supervise and influence executive agencies. In maintaining 
working relationships with executive agencies, members of Congress and their personal 
and committee staffs conduct daily meetings or phone calls, send emails, hold working 
lunches and a plethora of other activities through which information is collected and 
influence over agency behavior is exercised.68 Additionally, through non-statutory 
controls, such as statements made in committee reports, floor debates, and hearings that 
are not solidified into legislation, Congress maintains influence and encourages executive 
agencies to keep committees and subcommittees informed on their activities.69 Congress 
has come to rely more heavily on informal oversight because of its low cost, in that it 
does not require much work on the part of the legislator, and high rewards, in that it has 
proven to be effective and a preferred technique by executive agencies.  
D. DETERMINING GOOD OVERSIGHT 
Walter Oleszek states, “To determine the quantity and quality of legislative 
oversight is not an easy assignment.”70 For several reasons, determining whether 
Congressional oversight is effective qualitatively or quantitatively is difficult. First, there 
no universally accepted definition for oversight exists. Some definitions stress the 
investigative form of oversight while others state oversight refers to any congressional 
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activity that impacts bureaucratic behavior.71 Also, perceptions of effectiveness are 
driven by interest. To illustrate this point, Amy Zegart uses the example of off shore 
drilling regulation to highlight that environmental groups would view legislation much 
differently than oil companies.72 Lastly, informal processes are difficult, if not 
impossible, to measure. Traditionally, oversight is measured quantitatively by the number 
of formal processes, such as hearings, and legislation. However, as stated earlier, 
Congress has come to rely heavily on less formal means of oversight, such as phone calls 
and emails, which cannot be accurately measured, yet comprise a significant percentage 
of congressional oversight activity.73  
In her research into whether Congress’ oversight on the intelligence community 
was effective or not, Amy Zegart notes, “effective oversight may be hard to define, but 
ineffectual oversight is often easy to see.”74 Recognizing the difficulty in measuring 
oversight, Thomas M. Susman offers six characteristics from which to evaluate whether 
congressional oversight is effective: oversight is directed at the executive branch, 
routinely conducted with follow through and without duplication and excessive burden 
on the executive branch, pursued professionally, assists executive agencies shape 
priorities, policies, and procedure, uncovers inefficiency and corruption, and informs 
congressional decisions on the production of legislation.75 These characteristics provide a 
conceptual tool through which it is possible to evaluate the effectiveness of 
Congressional oversight subjectively on any given policy realm.  
With the executive branch expanding, in both size and through delegated and 
deferred power from Congress, to meet challenges in an increasingly complex world, 
Congressional oversight is paramount to preserving the delicate balance of powers 
between the executive and legislative branches of government. The U.S. Constitution has 
granted a wide range of powers to Congress, implicitly mandating the responsibility to 
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maintain oversight of the executive branch, which has been supported and reinforced by 
the Supreme Court. Through the committee system and formal and informal oversight 
processes, Congress conducts its implicit mandate to ensure the government operates 
efficiently and effectively, in accordance with the intent of Congress, and transparent to 
the American public. 
 25
III. CONGRESSIONAL OVERSIGHT OF THE DEPARTMENT OF 
HOMELAND SECURITY: THE NEED FOR REFORM 
Congressional oversight is like a magnifying glass: Hold it one way and 
you can examine an object closely; hold it another way and you can burn 
that object to a crisp.76 
As stated in the previous chapter, oversight is the method through which Congress 
supervises delegated authority to entities within the executive branch of government. 
Oversight serves multiple purposes: ensure executive compliance with Congress’ intent, 
improve the efficiency and effectiveness of government programs, prevent fraud waste 
and abuse, inform the public, and protect civil liberties, to name a few.77 Considering that 
DHS directly interacts with more than 3.3 million people daily, more than any other 
federal agency, and that the problem of managing the delicate balance between the need 
for increased security while protecting civil liberties lies largely within the realm of 
homeland security, few other elements in government require more robust oversight than 
DHS.78 However, the complicated committee structure through which oversight of DHS 
is conducted is preventing Congress from meeting its purpose of improving the efficiency 
and effectiveness of DHS. Currently, 108 committees and subcommittees have 
jurisdiction over DHS.79 To provide some perspective, the DoD falls under 36, while 
commanding more than 10 times the budget.80 Additionally, the standing committees for 
homeland security in the House of Representatives and Senate do not have the legislative 
authority to reduce the negative impact produced by competing committees. Numerous 
examples highlight the detrimental effects of the fragmented oversight structure on DHS. 
Failure to reform the oversight structure could, at best, prolong DHS’s evolution into a  
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unified and effective organization, or at worst, directly contribute to the failure to 
coordinate the prevention, response, and/or recovery during the next national level 
catastrophe. 
A. GENESIS OF THE PROBLEM 
In the aftermath of the terrorist attacks on September 11, 2001, Congress and the 
executive branch worked closely to develop a national enterprise to unify all branches 
and levels of government toward the goal of protecting the United States and its citizens 
from terrorism. Under the Homeland Security Act of 2002, DHS was established by 
combining 22 different federal agencies and departments under one cabinet to facilitate 
the national unity of effort.81 The creation of DHS represented the largest government 
reorganization since the National Security Act of 1947, which created the modern DoD, 
Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), and the National Security Staff in response to the 
dramatic change in the U.S. role in international relations.82 However, unlike the 
Congressional reforms mandated by the 1946 Legislative Reorganization Act, Congress 
failed to adjust itself to match the dramatic changes within the executive branch that 
occurred as a result of the 2002 Homeland Security Act. 
During the construction of DHS, many warnings about the problems would arise 
from Congress’ failure to match the major realignment of executive branch agencies. In a 
2002 CRS Report, Judy Schneider recognized “dispersed responsibility” can be 
beneficial, but also warned of the potential problems by stating: when no single 
committee can claim exclusive legislative jurisdiction over a specific subject, it may be 
difficult or impossible to enact comprehensive legislation.83 At about the same time, in a 
Brookings Institution report, experts stated, “whether congressional oversight enhances 
or impedes homeland security will, to an important degree, depend on how Congress 
carries out its responsibilities,” and warned, “unless Congress revamps its current 
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oversight structure, many of the promised benefits of the proposed executive branch 
reorganization are likely to be lost.”84 Senator Susan Collins (R-Maine), co-author of the 
Homeland Security Act and ranking member of the Senate Committee on Homeland 
Security and Government Affairs, argued for congressional reform during the 
construction of DHS, understanding that, “a proliferation of congressional subcommittees 
and full committees...complicates the authorizations process.”85 Despite these warnings, 
Congress showed no willingness to make changes to the architecture of congressional 
oversight for the new and robust department.  
B. DYSFUNCTIONAL FRAMEWORK 
Other than the initial creation of appropriations subcommittees for homeland 
security in both chambers of Congress, and the eventual establishment of a standing 
House Homeland Security Committee and Senate Committee on Homeland Security and 
Governmental Affairs, little was done to establish an improved oversight framework.86 
The current system has three major problems that prevent Congress from effectively 
performing its oversight function. First, too many committees and subcommittees have 
jurisdiction over DHS. Instead of reforming to streamline oversight jurisdictions, 
Congress has actually increased the number of committees and subcommittees with 
jurisdiction over DHS from the initial 86 that existed in 2003 to 108, where it remains 
today.87 Second, many of the committees are not focused on homeland security. 
Committees, such as Finance, Commerce, and Agriculture, which share jurisdiction, are 
not primarily concerned with homeland security issues and lack homeland security 
expertise within their staffs.88 The result is policy influence that does not always place a 
premium on homeland security. Lastly, the standing homeland security committees, the 
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House of Representatives Homeland Security Committee and the Senate Committee on 
Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs, do not have the legislative authority to 
mitigate the effects of having so many competing committees not primarily focused on 
homeland security. They share legislative jurisdiction, which makes them just as 
powerful as other standing committees despite their homeland security focus and 
expertise. Additionally, the Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Government 
Affairs has to split its efforts between homeland security issues and its legacy focus on 
government affairs, which is a daunting task encompassing the entire federal government 
that diverts a great deal of resources and expertise away from the homeland security 
focus.89 
Often viewed as an example of good oversight, DoD provides a model from 
which to compare DHS. Fewer committees and subcommittees compete for a piece of 
DoD, which is overseen by 36 congressional committees and subcommittees, which is a 
sharp contrast to the 108 overseeing DHS.90 With the exception of the Appropriations 
Committees in both chambers, all other committees and subcommittees are primarily 
focused on national defense. Only the Armed Services and Appropriations committees 
and their subcommittees have jurisdictional authority over DoD.91 For example, all 
Senate confirmations for DoD, other than the Inspector General, are considered by the 
Senate Armed Service Committee.92 The Committees on Commerce, Science, and 
Transportation, Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs, Judiciary, and Finance, 
consider senate confirmations for DHS political appointees.93  
To say Congressional oversight of DHS is ineffective and overwhelming DHS is 
an understatement and does not accurately describe the complexity of the problem. An 
article published in the Policy Studies Journal provides a better conceptual framework for 
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understanding the problem and its effect on DHS by describing the national enterprise for 
homeland security as an “anemic policy regime.”94 “Policy regime” describes the 
national enterprise for homeland security, including all parts and levels of government, 
the private sector, down to the individual working to improve homeland security. The 
different agencies and functions within DHS are described as “subsystems.” When DHS 
was established, the different subsystems were stripped from other policy regimes, such 
as the Immigration Naturalization Service (INS) from the Department of Justice (DOJ), 
and placed into a new one: DHS. DHS represents a boundary-spanning regime, in that it 
encompassed many different functions from other policy regimes.95  
Congress’ pre-DHS jurisdictional organization is one of the largest contributing 
factors preventing the establishment of a cohesive policy regime; the committees and 
subcommittees pull the different subsystems within DHS back towards their original 
policy regimes and away from homeland security.96 This situation creates cross pressures 
that confuse DHS leadership, prevents the production of needed legislation, overwhelms 
agency officials, promotes inefficiency, and prevents DHS from establishing a unified 
effort toward its mission of defending the homeland from all hazards.  
C. NEGATIVE IMPACT ON DHS: SOME EXAMPLES  
Today, the jurisdictional disparity between the 108 committees and 
subcommittees continues to prevent Congress from providing efficient and effective 
oversight, which is negatively affecting DHS’s ability to perform its function as the lead 
federal agency in homeland security. Congressional oversight, in its current form, 
presents an enormous distraction to DHS. In 2009, DHS officials responded to 11,680 
letters, gave 2,058 briefings, and participated in 166 hearings to Congress.97 This massive 
demand for information forces DHS officials to, as Secretary of DHS Janet Napolitano 
stated, “spend more time responding to congressional requests and requirements than 
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executing their mandated homeland security responsibilities.”98 This state of affairs has 
taken not only thousands of work hours away from the homeland security mission, but is 
estimated to have cost tens of millions of dollars.99  
DHS often receives conflicting direction from different congressional committees 
and subcommittees, which creates confusion, and also affects morale and performance. 
Michael Chertoff, former Secretary of DHS, stated, “truthfully...most people miss the 
biggest problem, and that is that the direction you get from the committees tends to be 
inconsistent.”100 In the wake of DHS and Federal Emergency Management Agency’s 
(FEMA) failure to coordinate the response to Hurricane Katrina in 2005, 13 bills were 
proposed by different committees that would affect FEMA’s organization and mission, 
with two generating significant Congressional action: H.R. 5316 and H.R. 5351.101 
Sponsored by the House Transportation and Infrastructure Committee, H.R. 5316 
proposed moving FEMA out of DHS and making it an autonomous cabinet level agency, 
while the House Homeland Security Committee supported H.R. 5351, which proposed 
that FEMA remain within DHS and subordinate to the Secretary of DHS.102 In the end, 
the Post-Katrina Emergency Management Reform Act of 2006, a compromise between 
H.R. 5316 and 5351, passed under 2007 Appropriations legislation, organized FEMA 
under DHS but with more autonomy, and restricted the Secretary of DHS from making 
dramatic changes to the agency.103 Despite the compromise, the act did not end 
uncertainty over the future of FEMA. In 2009, the debate was reignited with the proposal 
of the FEMA Independence Act, which argued for FEMA to be removed from DHS and 
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made into a cabinet level agency. Although the act was not passed, it would have 
constituted the 10th major reorganization within DHS, and the fourth for FEMA, since 
the establishment of the department.104 This uncertainty and conflicting direction from 
Congress can certainly be considered a contributing factor to DHS’s, FEMA in particular, 
notoriously low morale and painful evolution that continues to the present.105  
The jurisdictional fragmentation of the committee system also facilitates 
oversight, in the negative sense, by responsible committees. For several months before 
and after the “Underwear Bomber” incident on December 25, 2009, the CBP operated 
without a commissioner.106 Jurisdiction for the former U.S. Customs Service, 
reorganized into the CBP, belonged to the Senate Committee on Finance, which 
maintained oversight of the agency after the CBP was moved from the Department of 
Treasury to DHS.107 Preoccupied with the health care debate, the Senate Committee on 
Finance failed to hold a confirmation hearing on the President’s nominee for 
commissioner while it conducted confirmation hearings for Department of Health and 
Human Services nominees.108 Due largely to the structure of Congress’ oversight of 
DHS, the CBP was left without its most senior leader, even after agency mistakes 
allowed a terrorist to board a U.S. bound airplane. 
Congress’ current oversight structure creates conflicts and jurisdictional turf 
battles within Congress, which prevents the production of needed legislation. Since the 
establishment of DHS, Congress has failed to pass a Homeland Security Authorization 
                                                 
104 The first three reorganizations of FEMA occurred when it was originally organized under the 
newly formed DHS in 2003, during the Secretary Chertoff’s Second Stage Review (2SR) in 2005 , and as 
part of the Post Katrina Emergency Management Reform Act in 2006. Jena Baker McNeill and Jessica 
Zuckerman, “Five Reasons Why FEMA Should Stay at DHS,” Heritage Foundation WebMemo, no. 2736, 
December 15, 2009, 1–2. 
105 Recently, DHS has been rated 33 out of 34 governmental agencies in work place satisfaction, 
which has received significant congressional attention. Testifying before the House Subcommittee on 
Oversight, Investigations, and Management in 2012, Admiral Thad Allen, former Commandant of the 
Coast Guard, attributes “duplicative oversight,” among other factors, as the source of departmental 
discontent. Thad W. Allen, Testimony to the U.S. House of Representatives Homeland Security 
Committee, Subcommittee on Oversight, Investigations, and Management, March 22, 2012. 
106 Kaniewski, “Congress Should Consider Its Own Failures in Attempted Bombing.” 
107 Shiffman and Hoffman, “The Department of Homeland Security,” 209. 
108 Kaniewski, “Congress Should Consider Its Own Failures in Attempted Bombing.” 
 32
bill, a critical mechanism in providing good oversight.109 The House Homeland Security 
Committee has managed to draft legislation each year; however, the Senate Committee 
on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs has not been able to reciprocate the 
effort.110 This inaction can be attributed to the Senate’s failure to create an independent 
Committee on Homeland Security armed with the legislative power over the myriad of 
other competing committees. However, to much fanfare, both the Senate and House 
passed authorizations bills in 2011 (S. 1546 and H.R. 3116).111 The bills were sent to 
conference where House and Senate differences could be reconciled to create unified 
legislation. Yet, due to conflicts between chambers, the bill died in conference. In 
testimony before the House Committee on Homeland Security, Subcommittee on 
Management, Investigations, and Oversight in 2008, James Carafano characterized the 
repeated failure to pass an authorizations bill as an, “inexcusable shortfall.”112 Conflicts 
within and between the chambers of Congress, exacerbated by the proliferation of 
committees and subcommittees with conflicting priorities, have prevented the passing of 
basic and critical legislation needed to provide guidance and oversight to DHS. 
Jurisdictional authority in committees not primarily focused on homeland security 
has resulted in the production of poor legislation. In accordance with 9/11 Commission 
recommendations and increasingly concerned with the possibility that terrorists could 
smuggle a nuclear device into the United States through a cargo container, Congress 
mandated the Secure Freight Initiative (SFI) as part of the Safety and Accountability for 
Every (SAFE) Port Act in 2006.113 SFI required the screening of 100 percent of shipping 
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containers entering the United States by 2012.114 Many experts in homeland security 
argue that SFI is unfeasible in terms of resources and costs, when compared to the 
Container Security Initiative (CSI), through which only containers determined to be high 
risk are scanned.115 Senators Joseph Lieberman and Susan Collins, ranking members of 
the Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Government Affairs, agree with experts 
and support the risk based scanning under CSI; however, Congress mandated SFI before 
DHS could establish the effectiveness of CSI, and is supported by other committees in 
the Senate with jurisdiction over DHS.116 The Senate Committee on Homeland Security 
and Government Affairs is not strong enough to prevent the passing of “feel good” 
legislation that appeals to other committees with DHS jurisdiction, despite their 
homeland security focus and expertise. 
As stated in a report from the CSIS, the fragmented jurisdictional structure of 
Congress’ oversight “preserves the rivalries and cultural barriers that the creation of the 
Department was intended to eliminate; and it prevents DHS from acting as a single, well 
coordinated team.”117 The best example is illustrated by DHS component agencies’ 
regional organization. DHS consists of a myriad of regional structures: FEMA is 
organized in 10 regions, the Coast Guard in five, CBP in 20, and Citizen and Immigration 
Service (CIS) in three.118 Testifying in 2012 before the Senate Committee on Homeland 
Security and Governmental Affairs on the challenges facing DHS, retired Admiral Thad 
Allen stated that the incongruent organization of DHS “has severely constrained the 
ability of the Department to mature as an enterprise,” and that establishing unity of effort 
must be a priority in order to “[remove] barriers to information sharing within the 
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department and improved operational planning and execution.”119 In 2004, Thomas 
Ridge, wanting to streamline the department to make it easier for federal, state, local, 
private entities to coordinate with DHS, proposed a realignment that would foster unity of 
effort.120 The initiative was again proposed in DHS’s 2010 Bottom Up Review, in an 
effort to streamline command and control of the department.121 However, in both 
instances, the efforts by DHS leadership to unify the department’s regional organization 
failed. Through a recent GAO investigation on the issue of DHS realignment, very little 
documentation could be found showing any analysis by DHS or its component agencies 
on restructuring the regional layout of the department.122 However, J. Duncan Campbell, 
Tom Ridge’s former chief of staff, states that resistance came from component agencies 
and Congress.123 Each component agency did not want to change its organization, despite 
bigger picture benefits, and found congressional support in the committees that have 
maintained oversight through the establishment of the department. Congressional 
committees have provided obstacles to DHS reforms that preserve barriers that prevent 
unity of effort within the department. 
By applying Susman’s six characteristics of effective oversight listed in the 
previous chapter to Congress’ oversight of DHS, it is obvious that oversight of DHS 
cannot be considered effective. Amy Zegart’s quote, “effective oversight may be hard to 
define, but ineffectual oversight is often easy to see,” most certainly applies; Congress’ 
oversight of DHS is clearly problematic and requires improvement.124 To be sure, 
Congressional oversight is not the only contributing factor to DHS’s ills, nor will reform 
solve all of DHS’s problems. However, it is obvious that Congress’ oversight in its 
current form is hindering DHS’s evolution into the effective organization that can 
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coordinate across the national enterprise the prevention, response, and recovery from 
catastrophic man-made or natural disasters, which is in direct contradiction to the key 
purpose of oversight. At the core of the homeland security mission is the protection of 
American lives, the most important of all government functions.  
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IV. RECOMMENDATIONS FOR REFORM 
Having interviewed numerous members of Congress from both parties, as 
well as congressional staff members, we found that dissatisfaction with 
congressional oversight remains widespread.125 
The previous chapter outlined the problem with, and effects of Congress’ current 
oversight structure of DHS and argued that reform is necessary. Few would defend the 
current oversight system. In fact, many members of Congress agree, most notably the 
chairman of the Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Government Affairs, Sen. 
Joseph Lieberman, and chairman of the House of Representatives Homeland Security 
Committee, Rep. Peter King, who have made repeated calls for reform.126 Studies from 
the Brookings Institution, CSIS, Heritage Foundation, and the CRS, among many others, 
offer recommendations to guide congressional reform and promote robust oversight that 
would facilitate the evolution of DHS into an agency capable of coordinating the national 
enterprise in the prevention, response, and recovery from natural and man-made 
disasters.127 The options for reform are all geared toward the same purpose: streamlining 
committee jurisdiction and strengthening the homeland security committees to increase 
the efficiency and effectiveness of Congress’ oversight of DHS. The majority of the 
recommendations propose the remapping of committee jurisdictions, elimination of some 
committees and subcommittees, creation of a joint committee, or committees with 
increased legislative authority, such as combined authorization and appropriations 
powers. It is widely agreed by experts in homeland security that less aggressive reforms 
reducing a limited number of committees and subcommittees jurisdiction will not 
effectively improve the oversight problems of DHS.128  
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A. JOINT COMMITTEE MODEL FOR OVERSIGHT 
One of the most often cited recommendations comes from the National 
Commission on Terrorist Attacks upon the United States (9/11 Commission). In their 
report, the 9/11 Commission recommended, “Congress should create a single, principal 
point of oversight and review for homeland security,” based on the example of the Joint 
Committee for Atomic Energy.129 Establishing a Joint Committee for Homeland Security 
would dramatically streamline oversight by placing jurisdiction of DHS into one 
congressional committee comprised of members from both the House and Senate. 
Reports from the Brookings Institution, CSIS, and the CRS, as well as notable homeland 
security experts, such as Donald Kettl, all recommend similar reforms.130 
The Joint Committee model would improve oversight of DHS by decreasing the 
amount of hearings, reports, and testimonies that have become an enormous burden on 
DHS as only one committee would have the authority to hold hearings. It would 
eliminate the referral of bills to multiple committees with conflicting interests and 
different focuses, which has been hindering the passage of needed legislation, and 
resulting in poor legislation, and creating conflicting messages from Congress that 
confuse DHS officials.131 This option also eliminates the difficult task of reconciling the 
differences between House and Senate legislation, which killed the last proposed 
authorizations legislation. Understanding homeland security as a boundary spanning 
regime, having one committee overseeing the department would help foster unity of 
effort by eliminating legacy committees not primarily focused on homeland security that 
pull DHS’s subordinate agencies away from department’s core mission.132 Last, and most 
importantly, with only one committee having jurisdiction, it is much easier to pinpoint 
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responsibility for the oversight of DHS without the confusion that exists today, which 
motivates a more serious and efficient effort from the responsible committee.  
B. DOD MODEL FOR OVERSIGHT 
The Heritage Foundation published a more recent recommendation for reform in 
2011.133 The report recommends an expansive overhaul of the oversight framework, and 
building a model based on the structure of oversight for DoD. This proposal was more in 
line with the 9/11 Commission’s bottom line recommendation that oversight should not, 
at the very least, expand beyond one appropriations and one authorizations committee in 
each chamber; a Senate and House Homeland Security Committee with authorization 
authority and appropriations committees.134 As stated in the previous chapter, DoD is 
overseen by 36 congressional committees and subcommittees.135 The Senate and House 
Armed Services Committees and Appropriations Committees maintain legislative 
dominance and do not share legislative authority with other committees, which has 
facilitated the consistent passing of both authorizations and appropriations bills without 
fail.136 The DoD model differs from most recommendations in that it proposes the 
establishment of three standing committees in the House and Senate, with seven 
subcommittees organized along DHS’s operational lines.137 Although the Heritage 
Foundation report calls for a significant reduction in committees and subcommittees, it 
does not recommend cuts as deeply as all the previous recommendations arguing for 
single points of oversight with combined authorization and appropriations powers, or the 
creation of a Joint Committee for Homeland Security.  
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Some recommendations include variations to the DoD and the joint committee 
models, e.g., consolidation of jurisdiction into one committee in both the House and 
Senate, with both appropriations and authorizations powers.138 This option represents a 
hybrid between the DoD and Joint Committee models in that only the homeland security 
committees have jurisdiction, controlling both appropriations and authorizations, while 
still maintaining separate oversight institutions for homeland security in both chambers of 
Congress. More aggressive than the DoD model, and less aggressive than the Joint 
Committee model, having one committee in each chamber with appropriations and 
authorization jurisdiction maintains many of the streamlining benefits. Another hybrid 
recommendation, proposed specifically for the intelligence community but applicable to 
DHS, recommends the establishment of a temporary Joint Committee. Jurisdiction would 
be maintained primarily in one committee in both the House and Senate. During critical 
points in the Congressional cycle, such as during the deliberation on authorizations or in 
times of emergency, the two committees could temporarily come together to gain the 
legislative streamlining effects of the joint committee model.139  
C. REFORMING CONGRESSIONAL OVERSIGHT OF THE 
INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY 
Similar proposals for reform have been made in reference to Congress’ oversight 
of the intelligence community, which also suffers from a fractured oversight structure. 
Since the 1947 National Security Act, the national intelligence enterprise has grown into 
an extremely complicated phenomenon, which has made it increasingly difficult for 
Congress to provide solid oversight on the IC, especially after 9/11. Oversight of foreign 
intelligence falls predominately within the realm of the Senate Select Committee on 
Intelligence (SSCI) and the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence (HPSCI); 
however, the intelligence committees only have exclusive jurisdiction over the Director 
of National Intelligence (DNI), CIA, and the National Intelligence Program (NIP).140 In 
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the foreign realm, the SSCI and HPSCI share oversight responsibility with the 
Appropriations, Armed Services, and Foreign Affairs/Foreign Relations committees over 
the State and Defense Department’s different intelligence services, such as the National 
Security Agency (NSA), and Bureau of Intelligence and Research (INR).141 In the 
domestic realm, the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) is the primary agency 
conducting intelligence activities, which places some oversight responsibility on the 
SSCI and HPSCI; however, because of the FBI’s law enforcement functions and its 
organization under the DOJ, the judiciary committees in both chambers share 
jurisdiction.142  
The jurisdictional structure for Congress’ oversight of the intelligence community 
was made more complicated with the establishment of DHS. Prior to the attacks, the 
intelligence services of non-intelligence organization, such as Customs, Coast Guard, and 
Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), were overseen by the select intelligence 
committees. After DHS was established and the non-intelligence agencies with 
intelligence services were consolidated under the new department, oversight jurisdiction 
was shared with the House Homeland Security Committee and the Senate Committee on 
Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs.143 Although many differences exist 
between the intelligence community and DHS, the complicated web of oversight 
responsibility has created similar problems for the intelligence community that exists for 
DHS. In its findings, the 9/11 Commission described Congress’ oversight of the 
intelligence community as dysfunctional and stated that Congress’ failures stem from the 
refusal to reform themselves.144 Just as with oversight of DHS, many experts recommend 
the establishment of a Joint Committee for Intelligence, to streamline the oversight 
process and strengthen the Intelligence committees that focus primarily on intelligence. 
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After reviewing the negative impact of Congress’ oversight structure on DHS, it 
is clear that reforms that simplify and streamline the complicated web of oversight 
responsibility are necessary. Since the establishment of DHS, members of Congress have 
repeated calls for reform and a wide array of options proposed by notable experts in 
homeland security. Proposals for reorganizing oversight of DHS using the DoD and joint 
committee models, or hybrids between the two, provide feasible and effective 
frameworks to streamline committee jurisdiction and strengthen the homeland security 
committees. These options provide substantive reforms that would increase the efficiency 
and effectiveness of Congress’ oversight of DHS and eliminate many of the problems 
negatively affecting the department. However, after 10 years and systematic failures 
within the federal government that lead to the 9/11 attacks and poor response to 
Hurricane Katrina, Congress has refused to engage in any substantive reforms to itself.  
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V. AVOIDING REFORMS: THE CONGRESSIONAL 
PERSPECTIVE 
One must think of Congress as a complex organization responding to its 
environment. The institution adapts to outside environmental forces and 
public expectations, and to internal workload tasks and organizational 
arrangements.145 
Since the attacks on 9/11, Congress has become adept at mandating reforms on 
executive agencies, especially DHS and the intelligence community, yet, has made 
almost no reforms to itself.146 Considering the recognized need for reform and the array 
of options available, why has Congress failed to make any changes to itself? Rational 
explanations exist that can account for Congress’s failure to reform what has been 
characterized as an irrational oversight structure.147 What has been largely ignored in the 
literature arguing for reform of congressional oversight of DHS is the congressional 
perspective. Few of the recommendations consider the institutional and political purposes 
for oversight that drive the decisions of members of Congress. Jena McNeill, one of the 
most prolific critics of the current oversight structure, states, “Congress should unshackle 
itself from the constraints of jurisdictional protectionism and political pandering that 
plague the current system.”148 Like most experts arguing for reform, Jena McNeill’s 
recommendations are made from a homeland security perspective; a logical belief that 
nothing should get in the way of the national effort to increase homeland security. 
Considering that Congress’ refusal to reform has spanned two national emergencies and 
10 years, proposals for reform must begin by accounting for the Congressional 
perspective if they are to b e implemented.  
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A. PURPOSES OF CONGRESSIONAL OVERSIGHT 
As stated in Chapter II, many purposes drive Congressional oversight. Walter 
Oleszek organizes the multiple purposes into three categories: programmatic, 
institutional, and political. Programmatic purposes are those aimed at improving the 
efficiency and effectiveness of executive departments and agencies. Institutional purposes 
are aimed at ensuring that executive departments and agencies are operating within the 
intent of Congress and maintaining the balance of power between the separate branches 
of government. Political purposes are those aimed at generating positive publicity and 
electoral support from constituents and powerful interest groups.149 To be sure, all three 
purposes drive congressional behavior; however, proponents for reform have only 
addressed the programmatic purpose, to improve the efficiency, economy, and 
effectiveness of DHS in leading the national enterprise in homeland security. Both the 
argument and recommendations for reform have been made from a homeland security 
perspective by focusing almost exclusively on the programmatic purposes that affect how 
DHS operates, and have not accounted for the institutional or political purposes that also 
matter to members of Congress.  
B. INSTITUTIONAL EXPLANATION FOR REFUSING REFORM 
In her research into the jurisdictional fragmentation negatively affecting the 
intelligence community, Amy Zegart states, “nearly all of the proposed oversight changes 
required simply modifying internal congressional rules and committee jurisdictions, not 
passing new laws.”150  
As much as reform is needed and as simple as the reforms are to initiate, Congress 
may not view the changes as feasible, from an institutional perspective. Both the DoD 
and the joint committee models encourage partnerships as opposed to checks on the 
executive, can be susceptible to special interest groups, create stovepipes within 
Congress, and eliminates Congress’ ability to conduct an internal check on its self. Also, 
Congress intentionally encourages the proliferation of committees and subcommittees 
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with dispersed jurisdictional responsibility. This situation enables Congress to breakdown 
the demanding workload required to conduct robust oversight among specialized staffs, 
prevents gaps, and ensures Congress has more than one avenue from which to approach 
the executive branch on any given policy. Any recommendation will have to consider the 
institutional purposes if they are to be considered by Congress.  
As stated in the previous chapter, the Joint Committee model would streamline 
the oversight process by placing DHS inside the purview of only one committee, with 
both appropriations and authorizations powers. The DoD model, although not as dramatic 
as the joint committee model, strips jurisdiction of DHS from over 80 committees and 
subcommittees and vests legislative authority in only two committees in each chamber; 
the Homeland Security and Appropriations committees. All proposals for reform 
recommend similar changes: reduction of the number of committees with jurisdiction 
over DHS and improved legislative authority in homeland security specific committees 
and their subcommittees. Although these options present some significant benefits that 
would improve most of the problems with oversight on DHS, they would also create 
different problems that would inhibit Congress’ ability to conduct good oversight.  
Streamlining oversight could result in a relationship between Congress and the 
executive branch better described as a partnership, than the constitutionally mandated 
checks and balances. Both the armed services committees, in both chambers, and the 
Joint Committee for Atomic Energy (JCAE), have been criticized for being too 
supportive of the executive agencies they oversee and lax in oversight.151 For example, 
between 2003 and 2004, the Senate Armed Service Committees held no hearings on the 
war in Afghanistan and only nine on Iraq, while the House Armed Service Committee 
held only one for Afghanistan and 18 on Iraq. These hearings comprised less than 14 
percent of the Armed Service committees’ hearings that year, despite the DoD’s lead role 
in both conflicts.152 Not only does vesting oversight jurisdiction in fewer committees 
facilitate an improper relationship with executive agencies, those committees are also 
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more susceptible to the influence of special interest groups. Before the demise of the 
JCAE in the late 1970s, the joint committee was widely criticized for its responsiveness 
to the nuclear lobby and described as a, “huckster for the nuclear power industry,” which 
was a major factor leading to its abolishment.153 Additionally, too much streamlining 
creates stovepipes that protects group think and prevents information sharing and 
coordination; both critical aspects in leading the national enterprise in homeland 
security.154  
Congress intentionally encourages the proliferation of committees and 
subcommittees with dispersed jurisdictional responsibility. Several benefits exist to 
having multiple committees and subcommittees providing oversight on DHS. Spreading 
jurisdiction across multiple committees encourages congressional action and prevents 
gaps in oversight. Referring to oversight of DHS, Representative Lamar Smith, chairman 
of the House Judiciary Committee, describes this as, “purposeful redundancy.”155 
Second, in the ever present struggle for power with the executive branch, Congress 
benefits from multiple oversight committees that can engage the executive branch from 
multiple fronts. For example, although the Senate and House Armed Service Committees 
did not challenge the executive on Iraq or Afghanistan in 2003, the House Committee on 
Government Reform, with its broad investigative jurisdiction, held numerous hearings on 
the wars, which provided members of Congress another platform from which to engage 
the executive branch.156 Most importantly, the proliferation of committees and 
subcommittees enables Congress to divide the workload demands of oversight among 
specialized groups. The impact of globalization, advances in information technology, and 
growth of the executive bureaucracy has made the task of oversight increasingly 
complicated. Now more than ever, single issues, such as trade, health care, and terrorism, 
impact many different policy regimes. Additionally, due to the dramatic improvements in 
information technology, members of Congress are bombarded with more information 
                                                 
153 Davis, “9/11 Commission Recommendations,” 23. 
154 King, “Congress and National Security,” 15–16; Ornstein and Mann, “When Congress Checks 
Out,” 71. 
155 Associated Press, “Homeland Security Overwhelmed by Oversight.” 
156 Warburg, “Checking Presidential Power,” 239. 
 47
than can they can feasibly process. With fewer committees, the responsibility of 
continued watchfulness would overwhelm members of Congress and their personal and 
committee staffs. 
C. POLITICAL EXPLANATION FOR REFUSING REFORM 
While the recommendations for reform may be infeasible for Congress 
institutionally, they may also work against the political goals of members of Congress, 
arguably the most potent motivator behind Congressional behavior. The 9/11 
Commission warned that, “few things are more difficult to change in Washington than 
congressional committee jurisdiction and prerogatives. To a member, these assignments 
are almost as important as the map of his or her congressional district.”157 Ironically, the 
9/11 Commission goes on to recommend aggressive reforms that directly attack 
member’s committee jurisdictions. Amy Zegart states, “electoral incentives on the 
outside and the zero sum nature of committee power on the inside provide powerful 
reasons for Congress to continue hobbling its own oversight capabilities even in today’s 
post 9/11 national security environment.”158 Legislators avoid most options for reform 
because electoral incentives drive their decisions, even those that affect homeland 
security; politics do not stop at the water’s edge. In addition to the institutional purposes, 
any recommendation for reform will also have to address political purposes for members 
of Congress if they are to be implemented.  
In his 1974 book, Congress: The Electoral Connection, David Mayhew develops 
and empirically supports a theory that describes electoral incentives as the primary driver 
of congressional behavior.159 This is not to say that members of Congress are simply self-
interested actors. Mayhew highlights that reelection is not the only goal for members, but 
must be accomplished if other programmatic and institutional goals are to be achieved 
and maintained. Members are highly unlikely to achieve and maintain many significant 
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policy goals within one term. They must improve their stature within their chamber and 
develop internal and external support for their initiatives; members of Congress need time 
gained through reelection. In the electoral nature of government, constituents can punish 
or reward members of Congress by providing material support and, most importantly, 
through voting. Members of Congress must win the support and votes of their 
constituents if they are to remain in office and pursue all other institutional and 
programmatic purposes.160 
The committee system provides members of Congress with the organization 
through which they can best achieve their reelection goals. Members, for the most part, 
self select the committees on which they will serve. Once elected to Congress, members 
seek out specific committees that have jurisdiction over programs and agencies that 
benefit their constituencies.161 For example, the Senate Subcommittee on Oceans, 
Atmosphere, Fisheries, and Coast Guard is comprised of senators from coastal states, 
such as Florida, Alaska, South Carolina, and Washington.162 The same holds true for 
membership on the House Subcommittee on Counterterrorism and Intelligence, which 
is dominated by representatives from states with major metropolitan areas at higher risk 
of terrorist attack, such as New York, California, Georgia, and Pennsylvania.163 Members 
of Congress actively seek out membership on committees and subcommittees that 
provide them with resources and publicity that can advance their reelection goals.164 
In their effort to secure reelection, members of Congress conduct three types of 
activities: credit claiming, position taking, and advertising. Credit claiming refers to a 
legislator’s ability to deliver benefits to his constituency through his actions.165 Position 
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taking refers to public proclamations of judgment on any policy or issue of interest to a 
member’s constituency.166 Advertising refers to a member’s ability to develop a positive 
image with that member’s constituency.167 Membership on major committees or 
subcommittee with delegated authority that command authorizations or appropriations 
powers, such as the armed services and transportation committees or one of the 
appropriations subcommittees, grant members of Congress with the best ability to 
conduct all three activities.168 As stated in Chapter II, major committees control the 
budget, nominations for senior leadership positions, and can influence the actions of 
executive agencies and departments through formal and informal processes. 
Many proponents of reform will point to the smaller committees and 
subcommittees with only investigative powers as prime targets for elimination because 
they do not provide much control over significant programs and resources.169 However, 
even committees and subcommittees with only investigative jurisdiction provide 
members with opportunities to advance electoral goals by providing public platforms 
from which they can gain positive publicity through advertising and position taking. 
Whether a member of a large committee with budget authority or a small committee or 
subcommittee with only investigative authority, these committees and subcommittees 
provide members with the ability to pursue their reelection goals. 
To be sure, jurisdiction over the homeland security realm and DHS provides 
outstanding opportunities to conduct election-seeking activity. The Obama administration 
proposed $68.9 billion for homeland security for fiscal year 2013, which is a significant 
increase from the $16.9 allocated in fiscal year 2001; 52 percent, $35.5 billion, is to be 
allocated to DHS, with DoD, DHHS, and DOJ receiving lesser yet significant portions of 
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the homeland security budget.170 Within DHS, CBP, Transportation Security 
Administration (TSA), Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE), and the Coast 
Guard, overseen by different committees and subcommittees, are designated to receive 
roughly 70 percent of DHS’s total budget.171 Committee jurisdiction over any of these 
organizations provides outstanding opportunities to direct projects, grants, and activities 
that enable members of Congress to conduct credit claiming in their states and districts. 
In addition to credit claiming resources, DHS provides a popular platform for members to 
generate positive publicity. Evidence of such is highlighted in the number of 
Congressional hearings and testimonies in which DHS officials are called to participate. 
Between 2007 and 2009, DHS officials participated in over 7,000 briefings and provided 
testimony in 536 hearings.172 Even members of committees and subcommittees without 
legislative or fiscal authority that generate credit claiming opportunities can benefit from 
the position of taking opportunities that come from investigative jurisdiction over DHS. 
The potential for election-seeking activity is high in the realm of homeland security, and 
jurisdiction is intensely protected by members who stand to lose that opportunity. 
The homeland security realm and DHS itself presents members of Congress with 
a resource rich environment of election-seeking activities, which explains why attempted 
changes to alter committee jurisdiction, even small ones, have met stiff resistance by 
members who stand to lose access to the tools that can help them further their electoral 
goals. Although many members of Congress are calling for reform of the oversight 
structure for DHS, it is interesting to observe from which committees and subcommittees 
proponents and opponents to reform come. Supporters for reform come largely from 
committees not threatened by the proposed changes in jurisdiction, while committee 
threatened with losing jurisdiction present the most resistance. Senator Joseph 
Lieberman, Chairman of the Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Government 
Affairs, and Representative Peter King , former Chairman of the House Homeland 
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Security Committee and current Chairman of the Subcommittee on Counterterrorism 
and Intelligence, strongly support the recommendations of the 9/11 Commission and 
Heritage Foundation detailed in the previous chapter. They stand to gain from any 
streamlining that increases their authority to conduct election-seeking activities.173 
Representative Jon Mica, member of the House Transportation and Infrastructure 
Committee, and Senator Patrick Leahy, member of the Senate Judiciary Committee, have 
staunchly opposed any changes to the jurisdictional boundaries, and proposed improved 
coordination among committee staffs as a better solution.174 If their committees were to 
lose jurisdiction over homeland security, they would stand to lose a powerful source of 
election-seeking resources and publicity. The political motivators behind Congressional 
behavior are indeed powerful, and must be considered by those recommending reform. 
After considering the institutional and political purposes that drive congressional 
oversight, the options for reform proposed in the previous chapter do not present viable 
options for change. The joint committee model would eliminate the jurisdiction of all 
other committees in both chambers of Congress, while the less aggressive DoD model 
strips jurisdiction of DHS from over 80 committees and subcommittees. Such dramatic 
reforms conflict with the institutional and political purposes of oversight that most 
certainly matter to members of Congress. Institutionally, the reforms could facilitate the 
inability of Congress to act as a check on the executive. Additionally, too much 
streamlining could result in committees and subcommittees becoming overwhelmed by 
the massive and increasingly complex workload that comes from contemporary issues. 
Politically, oversight jurisdiction in the homeland security realm and over DHS provide a 
resource rich environment for election-seeking activities. Reforms that strip credit 
claiming, position taking, and advertising opportunities away from members of Congress 
threaten their ability to pursue their reelection goals. Proponents of reform of the  
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oversight structure for DHS must account for the congressional perspective and balance 
the programmatic, institutional, and political purposes of oversight to create feasible 
options for members of Congress.  
 53
VI. CONCLUSION: SUMMARY AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
The knowledgeable pushing, hauling, poking, and advocacy of Congress as it 
keeps a watchful eye on policy and administration can be criticized, but it is consistent 
with Congress’s role in a system of separate institutions sharing powers. What the United 
States now has is far from perfect, not even pretty or neat, but it could be far worse.175  
A. SUMMARY 
Oversight is the method through which Congress supervises delegated authority to 
entities within the executive branch of government to ensure the government operates 
efficiently and effectively, in accordance with the intent of Congress, and transparent to 
the American public.176 The dramatic expansion, in size and capability, of the executive 
bureaucracy since the close of World War II and rise of increasingly complex issues that 
cross multiple policy domains has forced Congress to defer and delegate more 
responsibility to the executive branch. In this contemporary era, the execution of robust 
and persistent oversight by members of Congress is paramount.177 Based on the powers 
granted to Congress by the U.S. Constitution, supported by Supreme Court rulings, and 
statutorily reorganized to conduct continued watchfulness, today’s Congress has the 
authority and organization to perform its oversight function. 
Under the Homeland Security Act of 2002, DHS was established by combining 
22 different federal agencies and departments under one cabinet tasked with leading the 
national enterprise toward the goal of protecting the United States and its citizens from 
terrorism.178 Despite multiple warnings about the problems that would arise from 
Congress’ failure to adjust committee jurisdictions to match the major realignment of 
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executive branch agencies, members preserved the pre-DHS boundaries. Currently, 108 
congressional committees and subcommittees share jurisdiction over DHS.179  
The impact of having so many committees and subcommittees with overlapping 
jurisdiction negatively affects DHS’s ability to conduct its homeland security mission. 
The highly fragmented system creates cross pressures that confuses and overwhelms 
DHS leadership, prevents the production of needed legislation, promotes inefficiency, 
and prevents DHS from establishing a unified effort toward its mission of defending the 
homeland from all hazards. Improvement of congressional oversight of DHS is needed. 
Studies from the Brookings Institution, Center for Strategic and International 
Studies, Heritage Foundation, and the CRS, among many others, offer recommendations 
to guide congressional reform and promote robust oversight that would facilitate the 
evolution of DHS into an agency capable of coordinating the national enterprise in 
homeland security.180 An array of options have been proposed to improve the oversight 
structure through remapping of committee jurisdictions, elimination of some committees, 
creation of a joint committee or committees with increased legislative authority, such as 
combined authorization and appropriations powers. The effects of streamlining 
committee jurisdiction would significantly improve congressional oversight of DHS. 
However, 10 years and two national emergencies have passed since the establishment of 
DHS and Congress has not engaged in any of the proposed reforms.  
Congress has not acted on the recommendations because they are institutionally 
and politically infeasible; excessive streamlining threatens to upset the balance of power 
with the executive branch and reduces opportunities for members of Congress to conduct 
election-seeking activities. Recommendations for reforming Congress’ oversight 
structure have been made from a purely programmatic perspective, such as seeking 
jurisdictional changes that streamline congressional oversight to facilitate efficient and 
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effective operation of DHS in homeland security. Only a more balanced perspective will 
produce reforms acceptable to members of Congress. 
B. A FLAWED BUT FUNCTIONAL SYSTEM 
Proposals to reform the fragmented committee system for improving the effective 
and efficient functioning of government conflict with the need to maintain the delicate 
balance of power between Congress and the executive branch and the political realities 
faced by members of Congress. Joel D. Aberbach highlights the conflicting interests and 
suggests the system for oversight, although flawed, achieves it most important purposes: 
The U.S. system brings together the self-interest of congressional 
politicians and the performance of oversight. And if one accepts the basic 
assumptions of a sloppy governmental system like our own, a system 
designed with the prevention of tyranny as its foremost goal rather than 
the promotion of efficiency or centralized accountability, then one can say 
that it works remarkably well when it comes to oversight. There are 
obvious problems of coordination, inconsistent messages to the 
bureaucracy, and errors that go uncorrected in this system, but the benefits 
my well outweigh the costs.181 
Fractured committee jurisdiction is a byproduct of the American system of government. 
With a legislature charged with ensuring effective and efficient operation of executive 
departments and agencies, in a system designed to balance power with the executive 
branch, while also having to secure reelection, the committee system as it exists may 
provide the best balance of all options. To be sure, despite the obvious problems caused 
by Congress’ oversight of DHS, significant oversight success has also occurred.  
The Post-Katrina Emergency Management Reform Act of 2006 provides an 
outstanding example of good investigative and legislative oversight. Created in the 
aftermath of DHS and FEMA’s failures in the response to Hurricane Katrina, the act 
turned FEMA back into a semi-autonomous agency, which prevented DHS from 
diverting resources and personnel to other agencies or positions within the department.182 
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Through the legislation, Congress mandated the formulation of the Quadrennial 
Homeland Security Review and Bottom-Up Review to facilitate better oversight of DHS. 
Responding to the Federal Response to Homeland Security Report, the act also 
eliminated the National Response Plan and replaced it with the National Response 
Framework, a more concise document, with clearly detailed roles and responsibilities for 
federal agencies, and integrated state and local elements in disaster response.183 
Successful improvements in disaster response at all levels of government were evident 
throughout 2008 in the responses to Hurricanes Ike and Gustav, floods that ravaged the 
Midwest, and wildfires in the West. As a more recent example, the response to Hurricane 
Sandy seems to continue the trend, which can be largely attributed to congressionally 
mandated reforms of DHS.184 The system for oversight may not be the most effective and 
efficient, but it is not entirely dysfunctional either.  
C. THE MYTH OF CONGRESSIONAL REFORM 
Many proponents for reform point to past periods in congressional history as 
evidence that significant reforms to the committee system are possible. A study from the 
Brookings Institution states: 
History gives grounds for optimism that Congress can make the 
organizational changes needed to grapple with the challenge of overseeing 
homeland security. In merging the Naval and War Committees into 
unified Armed Services Committees after World War II and in creating 
the Budget and Intelligence Committees in the mid-1970s, members 
overcame their innate inertia and put their policy interests above their 
parochial concerns. The same logic would support a comparable 
reorganization today.185 
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Several attempts throughout history have been made to adjust committee jurisdiction for 
the purpose of improving Congress’ general performance; however, no reforms have 
been substantive or lasting. In fact, the system that exists today is not that different from 
that of the post-1946 Legislative Reform Act Congress.186  
Congress underwent the most significant reforms to the committee system in 
response the establishment of DoD, CIA, and the National Security Staff in the 1947 
National Security Act.187 As the executive bureaucracy expanded to meet the 
increasingly complex challenges of the Cold War era, Congress was left without the 
capacity or capability to check executive dominance. Through the passing of the 1946 
Legislative Reorganization Act, Congress reorganized into a modern committee system 
capable of conducting robust and persistent oversight of the executive. As stated in 
Chapter II, the reform act authorized the establishment of professional staffs for all 
committees, eliminated many redundant committees, readjusted jurisdictions, and set 
rules for the establishment of subcommittees.188 Congress successfully cut the number of 
committees in both chambers by more than half the original number, from 33 to 15 in the 
Senate and from 48 to 19 in the House, to streamline and simplify oversight of the 
expanding executive branch.189 However, by 1950, Congress had simply created many 
new subcommittees: 80 in the Senate and 100 in the House.190 The number of 
committees and subcommittees in the immediate post reform period represented a 
dramatic increase in Congressional elements armed with jurisdictional authority. 
Referring to the impact of the 1946 Legislative Reorganization Act, Joel Aberbach states, 
“whatever else the reforms may have done, they did not solve either the problems of the 
committee system or of oversight.”191  
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Again concerned with executive dominance, Congress engaged in a second round 
of reforms to the committee system in the early 1970s. The Vietnam War, Watergate 
scandal, and rampant abuses of power by the intelligence community propelled Congress 
to engage in further reform to improve its general performance. Changes occurred 
incrementally with the passing of the 1970 Legislative Reform Act, 1974 Budget and 
Impoundment Control Act, and adoption of several reform proposals by the Hansen 
Commission in 1971, 1972, and 1974.192 However, the threat of altering committee 
jurisdictions met stiff resistance, and they were not adopted in either chamber. In the end, 
the reforms of the 1970s resulted in no decrease in the number of committees or 
subcommittees and only minor changes to committee jurisdiction. More importantly 
though, the 1970s reforms strengthened the powers of subcommittees through the 
adoption of the Subcommittee Bill of Rights in 1974, which provided subcommittees 
with fixed jurisdiction supported by automatic referral of legislation.193 By 1977, the 
number of subcommittees grew to 140 in the Senate and 151 in the House.194  
Discussing Congress’ 1970s reforms, Aberbach states that members of Congress, 
“were willing to build up staff resources... to assist them in their oversight and other 
work,” but “they tended to water down or not to adopt proposals that risked their 
prerogatives as individuals or committee members.”195 By the 1980s, DoD leadership 
complained of being overwhelmed by Congressional hearings. In 1983 alone, DoD 
officials had provided 2,160 hours of testimony to 96 different committees and 
subcommittees. In that same year, the Navy published 37 reports for only two 
committees, while responding to questions and providing testimony to a number of other 
subcommittees.196 Referring to the impact of the 1970s reform efforts, Leroy R. 
Rieslbach states, “Congress neither reclaimed authority from the executive nor imposed 
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its programmatic judgments on the executive with any regularity or success.”197 The 
reforms to the committee system were constrained by members’ need to protect their 
ability to conduct election-seeking activities, which resulted in little improvement to 
Congress’ system of oversight. 
In the early 1990s, at the beginning of the 104th Congress, the House pledged a 
series of sweeping reforms, as part of the Contract with America that would dramatically 
alter the committee system, which included the elimination of one in every three House 
committees.198 In the end, the House eliminated only three standing committees, 31 
subcommittees, and placed limits on the number of subcommittees each standing 
committee could establish.199 Unlike the Congress of the 1940s and 1970s, members in 
both chambers were suffering from a lack of institutional identity. Senators and 
Representatives had begun to see themselves as representatives of their states and parties 
before they identified themselves as members of the House or Senate.200 This 
predominantly partisan identification placed political incentives above all others; political 
purposes became the most potent driver of Congressional behavior.  
As institutional identities continued to decline, almost no effort has been made to 
change the processes or structure of Congressional oversight as evidenced by Congress’ 
failure to reform itself today.201 Over the past 70 years, the proliferation and 
strengthening of subcommittees and the decentralized nature of the committee system 
eliminated any streamlining attained by the 1946 Legislative Reorganization Act and 
increased the number of elements exercising oversight on executive agencies in both 
chambers. E. Scott Adler explains that, “members of Congress have fostered a structure 
in the legislative process that can both effectively govern and afford the flexibility needed 
to bolster relations with constituents for legislators who desire reelection.”202 
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Historically, substantive and lasting reforms to the committee system have never 
occurred and are unlikely to occur in the near future, largely due to the political purposes 
that motivate members of Congress. 
D. RECOMMENDATIONS 
Considering the programmatic oversight successes of Congress and history of 
failed attempts to streamline the committee system, the current system may be the best 
that can be expected. In her book, Eyes on Spies, Amy Zegart states, “perfect oversight is 
unachievable, but better oversight is.”203 Accepting the conflicting motivations that 
prevent a simplified and streamlined system does not mean that improvements cannot be 
made. Opponents to reforms that threaten to streamline committee and subcommittee 
jurisdiction over DHS believe that informal processes for improving coordination 
between leaders and staffs would better serve the varied purposes for congressional 
oversight.204 Undeniably, oversight coordination among committees and subcommittees 
has always been problematic, even in the defense realm. Numerous attempts have been 
made to improve coordination in the highly fragmented system through less formal 
means that do not disrupt existing committee jurisdictions. These less formal processes 
offer feasible alternatives to dramatic reform that aggressively attack committee 
jurisdiction. 
Memorandums of understanding can improve coordination between committees 
and subcommittees with conflicting jurisdiction over DHS.205 In the 110th Congress, 
members of the Senate Select Intelligence Committee, Appropriations Committee, and 
the Defense Appropriations Subcommittee created a memorandum of understanding that 
gave the leadership of each committee and subcommittee the right to attend each other’s 
meetings, hearings, and mark-up of bills.206 The goal was to eliminate duplication and 
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conflicting legislation to foster unity of effort. Other memorandums of understanding 
have included provisions that split jurisdiction by time or specific issues within a policy 
realm. For example, the House and Senate Commerce Committees alternate investigative 
oversight responsibility annually,207 which also reduces committee conflicts that prevent 
the passage of needed legislation. Memorandums of understanding are recorded as part of 
the congressional record and are typically respected during the referral of bills and 
provide a credible alternative to dramatic jurisdiction alterations.208 
More involvement by party and chamber leadership can also mitigate the impact 
of fragmented jurisdiction without making changes to jurisdictional boundaries. For 
example, during the initial phase of the health care reform debate in 2009, chamber and 
party leadership were critical in getting the debate out of the committees and onto the 
floors of both chambers.209 Similar to homeland security, jurisdiction of healthcare is 
fragmented. In the House, Representative Nancy Pelosi, Speaker of the House, pulled the 
Education and Labor, Energy and Commerce, and Ways and Means Committees together 
and managed their development of legislation.210 In the Senate, Senator Christopher 
Dodd, acting Senate Minority Leader, pulled the Finance and Health, Education, Labor, 
and Pensions Committees together.211 A difficult task indeed; both the Senate and House 
efforts were successful in generating legislation capable of being proposed to their entire 
chambers without threat of committee subversion. The influence of leadership external to 
the committee system committed to a common goal was able to mitigate the divisive 
interests of each committee in an area of jurisdictional overlap. More involvement from 
both party and chamber leadership would be instrumental in improving coordination 
among the conflicting committees overseeing DHS. 
Reduced use of multiple referrals of bills that fall into the realm of homeland 
security would also reduce the impact of fragmented jurisdiction. Typically, bills are 
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referred to only one committee.212 However, the use of multiple referrals is increasing in 
both chambers. Determining which committee has predominant (Senate) or primary 
(House) jurisdiction is not easy to discern, and committees often struggle over 
jurisdictional rights, especially in homeland security.213 Additionally, the complexity of 
contemporary issues regularly fall into multiple policy domains.214 This situation has 
facilitated the increased use of multiple referrals to increase cooperation among 
committees and eliminate stovepipes. However, in the realm of homeland security, 
multiple referrals amplify the impact of the highly fragmented committee system. A 
return to single committee referrals would alleviate some of the conflicting guidance 
DHS often receives from multiple committees, and would facilitate the passing of better 
and needed legislation. 
Committees that share homeland security jurisdiction should also hold joint 
hearings. By bringing together members from committees and subcommittees with 
overlapping jurisdiction, members still have the ability to conduct investigative oversight 
to inform their production of legislation, while dramatically reducing pressure on DHS. 
As stated in Chapter V, DHS officials participated in 536 hearings between 2007 and 
2009, which is more than any other executive department or agency.215 Not only would 
joint hearings dramatically reduce the amount of time and resources DHS spends 
responding, it would also foster more coordination and cooperation among committees, 
and positively impact the production of needed legislation and reduce conflicting 
guidance from Congress. 
These options for improving committee cooperation go beyond the purely 
programmatic proposals presented in Chapter IV and consider the institutional and 
political purposes that motivate members of Congress. They offer feasible solutions that 
can mitigate some of the effects of Congress’ highly fragmented oversight system on 
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DHS. All these options have been used in other policy realms with success. To be sure, 
these techniques are not formally instituted, can be revoked or ignored at any time, and 
will not solve all the issues with congressional oversight of DHS. However, considering 
the unlikelihood of any substantial reforms that attack sources of political power for 
members of Congress, these processes can increase cooperation among committees and 
subcommittees, and thus, mitigate the negative impacts of the highly fragmented system 
that oversees DHS.  
As the United States entered the Cold War era and the national security 
bureaucracy dramatically expanded, Senator Arthur Vandenberg famously coined the 
phrase, “politics stops at the water’s edge.”216 By that, the Senator was stating that 
personal or partisan politics should not be considered in matters of national security. The 
phrase became an institutional principle that many members of Congress repeat today. In 
reality, politics have not stopped at the water’s edge. Throughout the history of the 
modern Congress, members have been reluctant to relinquish the power that comes with 
jurisdictional authority, especially in the attention and resource grabbing realms, such as 
homeland security. From a congressional perspective, the committee system is a viable 
and important mechanism through which legislators can respond to their constituents, as 
well as guide the operation of the national government and maintain the constitutionally 
intended balance of power. Dramatic reforms that strip members of their opportunities to 
conduct election-seeking activities are not likely without external pressures that change 
the electoral environment.  
The current structure of congressional oversight is preventing DHS from 
continuing its evolution into the lead coordinating agency of the national enterprise to 
improve homeland security. Failure to reform the oversight process could, at best, 
prolong DHS’s evolution into a unified and effective organization, or at worst, directly 
contribute to the failure to coordinate the prevention, response, and/or recovery during 
the next national level catastrophe. The 9/11 Commission plainly stated, “the American 
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people may have to insist that these changes occur, or they may well not happen.”217 The 
missing ingredient from the past three eras of reform and today is public demand for 
specific change.218 Until public demand, the limited options presented in this thesis 
provide the only feasible options for improving congressional oversight of DHS. 
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